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Abstract 
This paper develops an empirical strategy to estimate whether subsidies to private 
medical insurance are self-financing in countries where public and private health 
insurance coexist. We construct a simulation routine based on a micro econometric 
discrete choice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changes on the 
utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. As an application, we 
simulate the main feature of the 1999 Spanish income tax reform that abolished the 
individual tax deduction for expenditures on private health insurance. We find evidence 
suggesting that the fiscal subsidy is far from self-financing. This result is driven by the 
fact that private medical insurance holders make concurrent use of public services and 
by the low price elasticity of the demand for policies.   
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Private medical insurance (PMI) is an important ingredient of health systems in most 
OECD countries. Despite the heterogeneous arrangements in each country, public 
policy invariably has to contend with the implications of PMI in terms of equity in 
access, and efficiency in the delivery of health care, quality, innovation, and costs for 
the public budget. Concerning costs, policies in some countries have tried to use PMI to 
induce shifts in demand from public towards private outlets in order to reduce the 
pressure on the public network. A typical arrangement consists in allowing PMI to 
cover the same contingencies as the public health system (effectively permitting 
“duplicate” coverage). This is indeed the case of Australia, Ireland, United Kingdom, 
and Spain (Colombo and Tapay 2004). A natural policy tool is then to subsidize the take 
up of PMI policies. While in some instances the government of these countries has 
eliminated pre-existing subsidies to PMI (e.g. the UK), in the majority of cases there 
exists some form of subsidy either via personal income tax or company tax. Moreover, 
similar arrangements might be expected in markets in transition with comprehensive 
and universal public coverage where PMI might develop in the future such as the Czech 
Republic, Hungary or the Slovak Republic. 
 
This paper proposes an empirical strategy to evaluate whether subsidies to PMI are self-
financing. We will illustrate this strategy with an application for the Spanish health care 
market. However, it should be said from the outset that our methodology could 
potentially be applied to a variety of countries and contexts, as we do not exploit any 
exclusive feature of the Spanish system.   
 
The Spanish National Health System (SNHS) provides free treatment financed through 
general taxation to all individuals. Apart from the public coverage, 10.3% of the 
population enjoy duplicate coverage from a PMI policy. The Spanish fiscal system 
treats generously the take up of PMI. Up to 1999, 15% of every euro spent on health 
care (including PMI policies) was deducted off total liabilities from the personal income 
tax bill. After 1999, individuals cannot obtain subsidies for PMI directly, but firms can 
offer company plans to their employees as a tax-free in kind benefit. This would imply a 
35% (the company tax standard rate) subsidy for each euro spent by the company on   3
PMI. Our paper will focus on income tax subsidies to individually purchased private 
health insurance, though our results will shed some light on subsidies through corporate 
taxation. PMI.  
 
The desire to evaluate the fiscal treatment of private health insurance has generated 
studies such as Gruber and Poterba (1994), who analyse the effect of tax subsidies for 
the self-employed in the United States. More recently, Emmerson et al. (2001) analyse 
the elimination of tax deductions for over 60’s in the UK, and Finkelstein (2002) studies 
the effect of fiscal changes on employer-provided supplementary health insurance in 
Quebec. Gruber and Washington (2003) analyze the role of subsidies to employee 
health insurance as a mean to improve insurance coverage in the United States. These 
studies exploit the fact that part of the population was not affected by the reforms in 
order to obtain a control group against which to measure the change in behaviour in the 
treatment group. In the Spanish case, the 1999 reform affected the whole population so 
we resort to a somehow more structural approach. In the absence of an exogenous 
control group, our strategy for the identification relies on the existence of an exogenous 
policy instrument that affects individual choices in a model of behaviour. Our data are 
particularly well suited for that purpose, as we have information on not only the demand 
side but also on  supply determinants, which constitute useful instruments when 
estimating, demand equations with endogenous variables.  
   4
In particular, our strategy is to formulate and estimate a micro econometric model of 
health care utilisation distinguishing between outpatient and inpatient episodes using 
data from a representative sample of the Catalan population in 1994 (the Enquesta de 
Salut de Catalunya), which contains information on insurance status, paid premia and 
health care utilisation. This model will have two basic elements. First, it will allow us to 
examine how changes in the premium faced by the consumer influence the purchase of 
private medical insurance. This is important since there is probably a part of the 
population that will purchase private medical insurance, even without tax relief. The 
elasticity of private medical insurance with respect to the premium is a crucial 
parameter in this respect. Second, it will predict the patterns of health care consumption 
according to whether the individual has/has not purchased private medical insurance. In 
our specification we use both supply and demand determinants to identify the effect of 
tax changes in a model where the insurance premium is potentially endogenous.  
 
The patterns of health care consumption will influence the costs of each individual in 
the public system. Several dimensions are of interest. First, individuals with PMI also 
use the public network for both outpatient and inpatient services, and therefore the relief 
for the public budget is not full. Secondly, given the gatekeeper role of the General 
Practitioner (GP) in the SNHS, individuals with only public insurance use Specialist 
services less frequently than individuals with private insurance. Since health care costs 
are higher for a Specialist service than for a GP service, the expected cost of an 
individual in the public sector will be smaller than in the private sector. Thus, in order to 
obtain estimations of the changes in health care expenditures arising from changes in 
the patterns of utilisation, we need data on the cost of both a GP and a Specialist 
service. Similarly, we combine estimates for the model of inpatient episodes with 
estimates for the cost of a hospital stay. Together with the representative sample for the 
Catalan population, this constitutes a micro simulation model for the budgetary effects 
of changes in the fiscal treatment of private insurance. 
 
We use this model to simulate one of the main features of the 1999 reform: the 
elimination of the subsidy to PMI via personal income taxes. When modelling the 
reform, we take into account the fact that the three largest private insurance companies 
in Spain amounted for a 52% of the market share in 1994 (Oliva and Carles 1999). As 
market power is substantial, one would expect that private insurance companies would   5
partially absorb the abolishment of the subsidy. This feature is incorporated within our 
simulation routine by means of allowing for partial shifting. Given the absence of a 
proper control group and/or individual data on post reform premia, the degree to which 
the tax change is absorbed by the supply side is derived from changes in aggregate price 
indices. In particular, our strategy consists in comparing the aggregate private insurance 
medical price index with a general composite good price index in order to take into 
account macroeconomic effects.  
 
Our approach combines two branches of the literature. One branch tries to explain the 
purchase of private medical insurance when a free public insurance scheme is available 
(King and Mossialos 2002, Propper et al. 2001, Costa and García (2003), Jofre-Bonet 
2000, Besley et al. 1999, Besley et al. 1998, González 1995, Propper 1993, Propper 
1989). These papers highlight the role of political ideology, quality, resources available 
to the private sector, insurance premium and income. Here we focus our attention on the 
effects the net insurance premium, as it is a proper policy instrument. In particular, we 
take into account the endogeneity of insurance premium by relying on instruments that 
come from the supply side of the market. Though our data are good for this purpose, it 
is not rich enough to deal with political ideology, resources available to the private 
sector or quality determinants. Moreover, these factors might have some inertia and 
their capacity to adjust in the short term might be limited. Hence our estimates should 
provide a good approximation to the effects of the tax reform at least in the short term.  
 
Our paper is also related to another branch of the literature on health care utilization in 
the context of a NHS where both public and private alternatives are available 
(Windmeijer and Santos Silva 1997, Vera-Hernández 1999, Propper 2000, López- 
Nicolás et al. 2000, López-Nicolás 2001, Jones et al. 2002, Van Doorslaer et al. 2002 
and Rodríguez and Stoyanova 2004). This literature recognizes the complex mix of 
public and private care demand that takes place in a NHS. Taking this mix into 
consideration is necessary to analyze the redistributive consequences of the system 
(Besley and Coate 1991), as well as understanding the public support for NHS funding 
(Buchardt and Propper 1999, Hall and Preston 1998). This mix of public and private 
health care can be explained by theoretical models of majority voting (Epple and 
Romano 1996, Gouveia 1997).  
   6
The behavioural model that we present in this paper combines several features from the 
studies cited above and bridges the gap between studies of utilisation and studies of 
insurance choice by letting changes in policy instruments feed through to changes in 
utilisation via changes in insurance tenure. This is a novel feature that ultimately allows 
us to estimate the expected budgetary impact of changes in the fiscal treatment of PMI. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the main institutional 
features of the Spanish health system together with the pattern of utilisation of 
outpatient and inpatient services in Catalonia according to insurance status. This 
motivates the discrete choice model for utilisation that we present in section 3. Section 4 
is devoted to estimate how the abolishment of the tax revenue rebate influenced the 
market premium. Section 5 discusses the cost simulation methodology and its results for 
the fiscal reform that eliminated the tax relief for expenditures on health care. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Duplicate coverage and patterns of health care services utilisation 
 
We consider that an individual has duplicate coverage if he (or she) is entitled to receive 
free health care from the public network and, additionally, he is covered by a privately 
purchased insurance policy which covers private health care. By analogy, we shall 
denote as single coverage the situation where individuals are only entitled to free health 
care from the public network. Note that individuals with single coverage that visit a 
private provider pay out of pocket the full cost of treatment. 
 
Table 1 shows the number of individuals belonging to each of the types of coverage in 
Catalonia at the time when the data were collected. From a total population of 6059484 
in 1994, the Enquesta de Salut de Catalunya (ESCAT) shows that approximately 20% 
enjoyed duplicate coverage whereas 77% only had single coverage.
1 The individuals 
who enjoy duplicate coverage report an annual average premium payment per 
household of € 989.70 (all money figures in the paper have been adjusted for inflation 
                                                           
1 The remaining 3% of the population corresponded to individuals who have used their right to obtain free 
health care to opt out of the public network in favour of a private provider. This option is only available to 
civil servants and, while effectively enjoying the same services as those available under the additional 
policy for an individual in duplicate coverage, this is a situation of single coverage because the possibility   7
up to May 2002). The sample weights allow us to construct an estimate for aggregate 
expenditure on premia, which amounts to € 461.33 M for Catalonia. Foregone taxes 
from the deductions associated to these expenditures are calculated at € 69.2 M  (15% of 
€ 461.33 M.) 
 
The ESCAT contains detailed information on the last visit to a physician in the fifteen 
days previous to the interview. In particular it is possible to know whether an individual 
has visited either a GP or a Specialist and whether the visit has been to either a public or 
a private provider.
2 The third row of Table 2 shows that the proportion of individuals 
without any visit is practically identical for single and duplicate coverage groups. This 
suggests that the insurance status does not affect the probability of an outpatient 
episode. This is also observed with data representative for the whole of the Spanish 
population (López Nicolás 2001 and Alvarez 2001). Rows from fourth to eight in Table 
2 show that people with single coverage mostly visit public outlets while those with 
duplicate coverage mostly visit private outlets. This suggests that public health care 
costs can increase if the amount of people with single coverage increases. Notice also 
that people with duplicate coverage concentrate their health care consumption in visits 
to the private Specialist. However, people with single coverage mostly visit the public 
GP. Consequently, insurance seems to influence very importantly the utilization profile 
(GP vs. Specialists), but not whether to visit a doctor. 
 
As for inpatient episodes, information is not as rich as in the case of outpatient episodes. 
Individuals in the survey are asked whether they have stayed in a hospital within the 
previous 12 months. However they are not asked whether this stay was at a public or a 
private outlet. We will determine this using the answer to the question “What coverage 
did you use more frequently along the year?”. We adopt the following criterion for 
individuals that declare to have undergone an inpatient episode: we assume that the 
inpatient episode is at a public outlet if the individual declares to have used the public 
coverage more frequently along the year. Otherwise it is considered as an inpatient 
episode at a private outlet. This assignment procedure is based on the reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                          
to use the public network has been foregone. Given the peculiarity of this regime these individuals are 
excluded from our analysis.  
2 This information is only available for the last visit of the previous 15 days prior to the interview. 
Consequently we only consider the expenditure caused by this last visit. We believe that this is of minor   8
assumption that an individual will report to have used public (private) outlets more 
intensively if indeed he has undergone an inpatient episode at a public (private) outlet 
within the previous 12 months. At the end of the paper we will see that our qualitative 
conclusions are robust to this assumption. 
 
The bottom part of Table 2 shows that insurance status does not influence the 
probability of having an inpatient episode. As in the case of outpatient visits, individuals 
with single coverage mostly use public inpatient services, as they would have to pay out 
of pocket to use private ones. Individuals with duplicate coverage mostly use private 
outlets but a non-negligible fraction uses public outlets. This is because, as in the British 
context (Besley et al. 1999), the private sector in Spain deals with elective surgery when 
waiting lists are long, but major surgical interventions are most frequently carried out 
within the public sector. Moreover, private insurance policies cover some but not all 
hospital expenses. According to OCU (1997) many companies limit to 30 days the 
number of hospital days that will be paid for within a given year, with stricter limits to 
the number of days in intensive care.
3 The OCU report also reveals that the public sector 
covers a much more comprehensive list of treatments than any of the policies offered by 
the private sector. In these circumstances patients might resort to public outlets for 
hospitalisations even when they enjoy private insurance. 
 




As we have seen above, while insurance status does not influence the probability of 
demanding health care, it affects whether consumption takes place at either a public or a 
private outlet. Consequently our empirical model is specified with a view to estimate the 
probabilities of utilisation of services that generate either a cost or a saving for the 
public sector and, in particular, how the price of a private health insurance affects these 
                                                                                                                                                                          
importance for our purposes as the vast majority had just one visit (83% of those that had at least one 
visit).  
3 OCU stands for Consumers and Users Organization. Approximately every two years OCU publishes a 
report on private medical insurance in Spain. The report analyzes the insurance contracts offered by the 
most important private insurance companies in Spain.   9
probabilities. We will consider the two most important dimensions of health care 
utilization: outpatient visits and hospital inpatient episodes.  
 
Individuals who use outpatient services within fifteen days before the interview can be 
observed visiting either a GP or a Specialist at either a public or a private outlet. On the 
other hand these individuals can have either only single coverage or duplicate coverage. 
We therefore consider the following mutually exclusive events in which, conditional on 
usage of outpatient services, any individual in the population might be observed: 
 
State 1: Single coverage only, visit to a GP at a public outlet  
State 2: Single coverage only, visit to a Specialist at a public outlet  
State 3: Single coverage only, visit to either a GP or a Specialist at a private outlet 
State 4: Duplicate coverage, visit to a GP at a public outlet 
State 5: Duplicate coverage, visit to a Specialist at a public outlet 
State 6: Duplicate coverage, visit to either a GP or a Specialist at a private outlet 
 
Note that it is important for our purposes to distinguish between Specialist and GP use 
in the public network. In the public network, GPs have a gatekeeper role. Consequently 
individuals with single coverage have a lower probability of visiting a Specialist, which 
is more expensive. As we are only concerned with public expenditures, we are not 
interested in distinguishing the differential use of GP or Specialist in the private 
network.  
 
During the 12 months prior to the interview, individuals might have undergone an 
inpatient episode at either a public or a private outlet.
4 On the other hand these 
individuals can have either only public coverage or duplicate coverage. We therefore 
consider the following mutually exclusive events in which, conditional on usage of 
inpatient services, any individual in the population might be observed: 
 
State 1: Single coverage only, inpatient episode at a public outlet  
                                                           
4 We have very limited information about inpatient episodes other than the latest. Consequently we 
consider a discrete choice model for the use of inpatient services in a year, neglecting the fact that some 
people might have two or more inpatient episodes in a year.  We believe that this is of minor importance 
for our purposes as the vast majority had just one inpatient episode (84.4% of those that had at least one 
episode).    10
State 2: Single coverage only, inpatient episode a private outlet 
State 3: Duplicate coverage, inpatient episode at a public outlet 
State 4: Duplicate coverage, inpatient episode at a private outlet 
 
In similarity to previous studies that address utilisation of health services in a discrete 
choice context (see e.g. Gertler et al. 1987, Bolduc et al. 1996 or Propper 2000),
5 let 
Uji=U(Hj,Yi, Pj) denote the utility derived from receiving care from provider j by the ith 
individual, where Hj is the expected health status after treatment, Yi is consumption of 
the rest of goods and Pj  is the price of health care from provider j. The individual 
chooses the provider j within his budget set such that Uij>Uik ∀ k≠j. 
 
By choosing a linear (in parameters) functional form and adding a random disturbance 




where yij contains variables that vary between alternatives (and possibly individuals), Pij 
is the price for consumer i of obtaining health care through provider j, and Xi contains 
variables that vary among individuals. 
 




The above discrete choice model encompasses the multinomial logit, the conditional 
logit, the nested multinomial logit and the multinomial probit. In recent years, due to the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
5 For similar econometric models in the area of labour supply and participation in welfare programs see 
Keane and Moffitt 1998 and Bingley and Walker 2001. 
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availability of powerful computers, the multinomial probit model has become the 
preferred model to deal with discrete choice problems. This is because it leaves the 
variance covariance matrix of the error terms unrestricted, allowing for any correlation 
pattern among unobservables. However, this comes at a cost. In order to identify the 
model, one needs at least one continuous variable that takes different values in each 
alternative (Keane 1992). A natural candidate is the price of medical care when it varies 
across alternatives. This is possibly the case of some health care systems like the French 
one where the fees or copayments charged by GP’s will be different from those charged 
by Specialists. However, in the context of a NHS where medical care is free at the point 
of consumption, the monetary price for GP and Specialist is the same: zero. Other 
candidates could be waiting time or travel time but we do not observe these non- 
monetary prices. Consequently, given that neither our institutional set-up nor our data 
give us enough variation to estimate the multinomial probit, we have used the 
conditional logit as our econometric specifications. For the same reason, Deb and 
Trivedi (2002) choose a multinomial logit instead of a multinomial probit for their 
application to the US health care system.
6 Possibly due to similar problems, the logit 
models are still widely used in the literature of insurance and provider choice (see, e.g. 




3.2 Explanatory variables and estimation results 
 
3.2.1 Estimation of the private insurance premium  
 
Prior to the estimation of the above model for both outpatient and inpatient episodes
7, 
we need to discuss how the insurance premium is obtained. The insurance premium is 
an important regressor in the above specification since the net insurance premium is the 
policy tool of interest. Data on insurance premium can only be observed for those 
individuals with private medical insurance. Consequently we need to estimate the value 
                                                           
6 Notice that a Nested Logit in which first consumers choose insurance status, and then choose health care 
use in a second stage is not an alternative either. In order to achieve non-parametric identification of that 
model, one would also require a variable that varies with respect to health care provider. Otherwise, the 
inclusive value of the second stage would be a function of the variables already included in the first stage.   12
of the insurance premium in order to deal with this sample selection issue (Heckman, 
1979). In similarity to other studies (see e.g., Costa and Garcia 2003, Bolduc et al. 1996, 
Gertler et al. 1987), we resort to a hedonic price model that allows us to predict the 
premium for the entire set of individuals, using a Heckman two-stage procedure that 
uses the Mills ratio to control for sample selection. This is the same strategy that 
Bingley and Walker (2001) use in a model of labour supply and Attanasio et al. (2001) 
use in an educational enrolment model where wages are only observed for those that 
work. Specifically the model used is 
 
, 1 , ) ln(





d if v Z premium





where d takes value 1 if the individual enjoys duplicate coverage, the error term vector, 
(v1,v2), follows a bivariate normal distribution, and Z1 and Z2 are exogenous regressors. 
The first equation is a reduced form discrete choice model for duplicate coverage and 
the second equation determines insurance premium. Previous research has identified 
socioeconomic variables of the head of the household as determinants of duplicate 
coverage. Hence in Z1 we include variables referring to the head of the household where 
the individual resides: age, social class, education, job category, and labour supply 
status. We also include variables pertaining to the individual himself: smoking status, 
migration status and variables referring to the whole household: household income and 
controls for different types of household. The vector Z2 contains the age of the head of 
the household, the type of household and, importantly, the average payments from a 
large insurance company to the doctors in the region where the individual lives.
8 This is 
a very important source of variation, since it is independent of individual characteristics 
(the variables X and y) in the utility function. Introducing supply side data is, whenever 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 Since outpatient and inpatient episodes are measured over a different time window, we estimate the 
corresponding models separately. 
8  Notice that we exclude all the socio-economic variables, including income, from the equation for the 
insurance premium. These exclusions, which are necessary in order to achieve non-parametric 
identification of the model, are motivated by the perception that there is not an important degree of 
vertical differentiation in the market. Indeed, according to OCU (1997), for a couple with two children all 
the private insurance companies analyzed were assessed between good and acceptable, but none of them 
received either a rate of very good or a rate of bad. This limited degree of vertical differentiation in the 
private market gives support to our exclusion restrictions. That is, if vertical differentiation were 
important we would expect that the rich would buy better (and possibly more expensive) private 
insurance than the poor. In that circumstance, income would influence the premium directly. However it 
seems that vertical differentiation is not an important feature of the health care insurance market in Spain.   13
available, a common source of identification in models of demand with endogenous 
regressors. Our assumption is that the geographical variation in the prices paid to 
doctors by insurance companies is uncorrelated with the error term of the utility 
function. This would be the case when the variability in prices paid to doctors is due to 
different degrees of bargaining power between insurance companies and the doctors of 
the region. Town and Su (2003) also exploit the variation in the supply of hospitals and 
beds at the county level to identify parameters of the utility function. Their argument is 
that the supply of health care services will influence Health Maintenance Organization 
relative bargaining power The variables in Z1 and Z2 that are not included in either X or 
yj will identify the model, that is, they will tell apart the premium effect from the effect 
of X or yj in the discrete choice model of equation (2).
 9 
 
The insurance premium is the price paid by individuals in states 4, 5 and 6 of the 
outpatient model and states 3 and 4 of the inpatient model. This is the main price in our 
specification as it is the policy tool affected by fiscal policies. Still, it is not the only 
price that consumers pay. Visiting a public GP or Specialist is free, regardless of having 
duplicate coverage. Hence states 1, 2, 4 and 5 do not require additional payments, apart 
from the private insurance premium that we have discussed above. State 3 requires the 
individual to pay the full amount of the visit out of pocket, as they do not have a private 
insurance contract. We do not have data for this price, which most likely depends on the 
medical speciality and the reason for the visit. This means that we ignore the effect of 
the fiscal reform via the change in the after tax price of services paid out of pocket. 
However, we do not expect an important change in this sector as less than 5% of 
outpatient episodes for individuals with single coverage are visits to private outlets. 
Although we do not observe it in our data, consumers in state 6 will in some occasions 
have to pay a small flat fee for service, in addition to the premium. According to OCU 
(1997) this flat fee varies from zero to 1.8 euros depending on the insurance company. 
                                                           
9 For the sake of brevity we do not include the estimates for this model of insurance premium. 
Nevertheless it is worth mentioning that the expected premium increases with household size, age of the 
head of the household and our measure of costs from the supply side. These results are in accordance with 
data published by OCU (1997). According to this survey, the premium varies according area of residence. 
In our specification this is captured by the regional cost proxies, which affect positively the expected 
premium. The OCU survey also reveals that only two companies charge a different premium according to 
sex. That might be a reason why sex did not appear to be significant in the estimation. Another reason for 
that might be that most policies are contracted for the entire household. This is why the type of household 
turns out to be significant in the estimation. The entire set of estimates for this model is available on 
request.   14




3.2.2 Estimation of health care utilization models 
 
In this section, we will comment on the results of the estimation of both outpatient and 
inpatient health care utilization models. One of our key regressors is the insurance 
premium since it will be one of the main determinants of the probability of having 
private medical insurance. As it is a predicted regressor, we report bootstrapped 
standard errors. The rest of the explanatory variables are demographic characteristics 
such as age, categorical household income, labour status, education level for the head of 
the household, sex and health related variables (chronic diseases, accidents, limiting 
conditions and self assessed health).11 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and gives the definition of the variables. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the parameter estimates for the conditional logit specification of 
outpatient and inpatient utilization, respectively. The estimation of the models requires 
the normalisation of the parameters corresponding to one of the alternatives. In this case 
the parameters of state 1 are set equal to zero for both models. For our final 
specification, we only retained those variables that were either significant or close to be 
significant.
12 That is why there are some empty cells in both Table 4 and 5. Individuals 
with only single coverage will not pay the insurance premium. That is why the latter 
does not enter in states 2 and 3 of the outpatient model and state 2 of the inpatient 
model. Notice that we restrict the coefficient of the insurance premium across states 4, 5 
and 6 of the outpatient model, and states 3 and 4 of the inpatient model. This is because 
the premium affects the probability of buying private medical insurance, but not the 
type of service used once the insurance status has been chosen.  
 
Concerning the estimates for the coefficient associated to the premium, note that they 
are negative, as expected, and statistically significant different from zero at the 95% 
                                                           
10 Given the limited information with respect to these prices, previous studies have also been unable to 
control them in an explicit way, see for instance Propper 2000 and Vera-Hernandez 1999. 
11 In the ESCAT 1994, income is a categorical variable. About one third of the sample does not answer 
the income question. For this group of people we impute its category using an interval regression over 
household socio demograPMIc characteristics.   15
confidence level. Note also that coefficients are very similar in the outpatient model (-
1.59) and the inpatient model (-1.547). The price elasticity of private medical insurance 
obtained from the outpatient model is –1.14 (standard error 0.24), which is very close 
the figure obtained from the estimates for the inpatient model, -1.09 (standard error 
0.34).  
 
Although the effect the net price of a policy is our main parameter of interest, it is also 
worthwhile noting that both income and education positively influence the tenure of 
private coverage and the use of private health care. Being self-employed also increases 
the probability of buying private medical insurance, suggesting that self-employed 
individuals have a higher opportunity cost of waiting.  
 
 
4. The influence of the tax reform on the private insurance premium 
 
In the remaining sections section we illustrate how the econometric model that we have 
presented in the previous section can be used to simulate changes in the fiscal treatment 
of PMI. In order to do so, we start by estimating the effect of the Spanish income tax 
reform on the equilibrium level of the private insurance premium. In 1999 the 
possibility to obtain a rebate of 15% on all expenditures on health care, including 
premium of individually purchased PMI, was abolished. If the market price of the 
insurance premium had remained constant in real terms, private insurance would have 
been 17.6% more expensive for consumers after the tax reform. However it would be 
unrealistic to assume that the tax change was fully shifted to consumers. As market 
power was a prominent feature of the private insurance market, one would expect that 
the private insurance companies would absorb part of the 17.6% increase in costs.
13 In 
turn, if the companies absorbed most of the increase in real costs, the patterns of 
utilisation would not change much as a result of the tax reform. This would imply a 
small increase in public health care costs that would be more than compensated by the 
reduction in tax expenditures associated to the abolition of the rebate. It is therefore 
important to establish the degree of shifting in order to estimate the budget 
                                                                                                                                                                          
12 For this purpose, we use standard errors computed using the outer product of the gradient. 
13 According to Oliva and Carles (1999), the three largest private insurance companies in Spain amounted 
for a 52% of the market share in 1994. This indicates that market power is substantial.   16
consequences of the reform. As we mentioned in the introduction, due to data 
limitations we cannot use a difference-in-difference strategy in order to estimate the 
influence of the reform on the private insurance premium. Consequently, we are forced 
to rely on a Before-After strategy. Of course, this requires strong assumptions on the 
evolution of private insurance premium, but these are more reasonable than simply 
assuming that the reform was fully absorbed by consumers. Indeed, given the large and 
sharp decrease in the private medical insurance price index that we will report below, 
we believe that the full shifting assumption would be untenable.   
 
Table 6 shows the rate of increase of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and individually 
purchased Private Medical Insurance Index (PMII) for Catalonia, the Spanish region 
whose population is represented by our data. From the third column, it is clear that the 
inflation rate for the PMII was no less than a 7% per year between 1994 and 1998. In 
1999, the year that the reform took place; the inflation rate of PMII fell to 1.55%. 
Before 1999, the PMII inflation rate was larger than the CPI inflation rate, while it was 
smaller in 1999 and 2000. Consequently, in the year of the reform and the following 
one, the market price of private medical insurance sharply decreased in real terms. This 
seems to imply that the private insurance companies absorbed part of the increase of the 
net insurance premium resulting from the tax reform.  
 
By comparing the inflation rate of PMII before and after the reform it seems that the tax 
reform did have a considerable effect on the market price of private medical insurance. 
However, Before-After comparisons would be misleading if they attribute to the reform 
any other unrelated contemporaneous effect (Heckman et al. 1999). In fact we can see 
from Table 6 that macroeconomic effects might affect PMII. The large decrease in CPI 
inflation between 1996 and 1997 might be related to the sharp decrease in PMII 
inflation between 1996 and 1997. Consequently, we would like to net out any potential 
macroeconomic effect that might have influenced PMII in the years of the reform but 
was unrelated to it. The last column of Table 6 shows the quotient between the CPI and 
the PMII. This is done in order to clean the evolution of PMII from macroeconomic 
shocks. The influence of the reform remains clear, since this ratio varied between 1.5 
and 3.6 in the years preceding the reform but fell to 0.5 in the reform year and remained 
at 0.7 in the following year. 
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Consequently, in order to estimate the impact of the tax reform on the market premium 
we consider the following counterfactual: what would the insurance premium be had the 
reform not taken place. We estimate this by obtaining the geometric mean of the ratios 
in the last column of Table 6 for the years preceding the reform. Notice that these ratios 
should be clean of macroeconomic effects. We obtain 2.56 which means that, had the 
reform not taken place, the market premium inflation rate would have been more that 
twice the CPI inflation rate.
14  
 
When a temporal dimension is used to evaluate the impact of a reform, the dates in 
which the effects of the reform start and end are usually important assumptions 
(Heckman et al. 1999). The reform was announced in 1998 together with the public 
budget for 1999 and was part of a wide package of measures aimed at simplifying the 
tax code. Moreover, the reform was done by a conservative government, which, a 
priori, would be expected to favour private health insurance. It is not surprising then to 
find little evidence for anticipatory effects in the price indices: the ratio for 1998 is very 
close to that for 1997. We will assume that the effects of the reform lasted for 1999 and 
2000, that is, the year of the reform and the following one. In these two years the PMII 
inflation rate was smaller than the CPI inflation rate and hence the market premium 
price decreased in real terms. It seems that it took two years for the companies to 
partially absorb the effect of the tax reform. In 2001, the PMII inflation rate was larger 
than CPI, as in the periods previous to the reform, and consequently we assume that the 
influence of the tax reform is over at the end of 2000. 
 
Using the data from Table 6, which contains the effects of the tax reform, a private 
insurance premium with a market price of 100 monetary units at the end of 1998 would 
have cost 104.3 at the end of 2000. If the reform had not taken place, under the 
assumption that PMII inflation would have been 2.56 times larger than CPI inflation 
rate, we estimate that the market premium would have been 117.67 monetary units. 
However, given the 15% tax rebate, the net price for consumers would be 100.02. 
Compared with 104.3, this means that the cost of private insurance premia for 
consumers increased by 4.3% as a result of the tax reform. This is quite different from 
                                                           
14 Although it seems a large quantity, note that in the two years preceding the reform the value of the 
ratio was even higher. 
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the estimate of 17.6% that we would have obtained if we had assumed that private 
insurance companies did not partially absorb the effect of the tax reform. 
 
5. Are tax subsidies self-financing? 
 
Since our aim is to obtain an estimation of the potential savings associated to a smaller 
frequency of utilisation of public outlets of individuals with duplicate coverage, it is 
important to count with a valuation of the cost of using health care services.  
 
We use different sources to compute the cost of inpatient and outpatient public services. 
For outpatient services, we use data from a major medical insurance company. These 
data contain the amount of money that the insurance company paid to either a GP or a 
Specialist for a visit and also a series of demographic characteristics for each patient. 
This allows us to estimate a multivariate regression model for the cost of outpatient 
services. Details about this estimation are given in López Nicolás et al. 2000. Because 
we have separate data for GPs and Specialists, we can take into account that a GP visit 
is cheaper than a visit to a Specialist. Notice that we are using costs of a private 
insurance company to impute costs within the public sector. This could be criticised on 
the grounds that one of the sectors could be more efficient than the other. However we 
consider this a relatively minor effect which, given the magnitude of the figures we are 
about to obtain, is unlikely to affect our conclusions in a substantial manner.  
 
Our data on inpatient cost is obtained from López-Casasnovas and Sáez (1999). In their 
Table 1, they report the mean (€ 3468) and standard deviation (€ 550.3) of the cost per 
admitted patient at Spanish public hospitals.
15 Contrary to the case of outpatient 
services, we can rely on public sector costs when estimating the extra cost that the 
reform will cause to the public sector. The downside is that we cannot estimate a cost 
function for inpatient services over demographic characteristics, as we do for outpatient 
services. However, it is well known that demographic characteristics explain very little 
proportion of the variance of observed costs for inpatient episodes. 
 
                                                           
15 We selected the year 1994 as it is the one that corresponds with our health care utilization data. Lopez-
Casanovas and Saez (1994) report data for both Teaching and Non-Teaching hospitals. We use the data 
for Non-teaching hospitals as private hospitals usually have a Non-teaching status.    19
Concerning the computation of the expected public health care costs, consider the case 
of outpatient episodes. Let Pij denote the estimates for the probability that individual i is 
observed in state j. Let Cij denote the estimate for the cost to the public system that 
individual i generates under state j. Given these ingredients, it is straightforward to 
compute an estimate of the cost that the public sector can expect for each individual by 
means of the following expression 
(4) 
Where di
o equals 1 if the ith individual uses outpatient services and 0 otherwise. The 
probabilities of different states depend on the private insurance premium. As discussed 
in the previous section, we estimate that the reform increases the premium by 4.3%. 
Using this estimate, our micro econometric model allows us to predict the change in 
each of the six estimated probabilities for each individual due to the reform: ∆Pij. Thus, 
an estimate for the expected increase in costs to the public sector for each individual is 




Figures for the overall population are computed using the grossing up factors (sampling 
weights) provided in the survey. Given that our data for outpatient health care utilization 
refers to the fifteen days previous to the interview, we multiply our figure by twenty-
four in order to get an annual estimate. Also, we calculate standard errors by 
bootstrapping. Note that the cost estimates are subject to two sources of uncertainty. 
The first is the fact that we are using regression estimates for the cost per visit to a GP 
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reported in the previous section. Our procedure combines the two sources of uncertainty 
by replicating the estimation of aggregated expected costs 500 times, with each of the 
replications combining one bootstrapped set of estimates for the cost per visit with a 
bootstrapped set of estimates for the multinomial choice model.
16 
 
The procedure to obtain the expected increase in public inpatient cost is analogous to 
the case of outpatient services described above except for the fact that, given the data at 
hand, we use the average cost for the whole population rather the expected cost 
conditional on patient’s demographic characteristics. During the bootstrap process for 
inpatient costs, we obtain draws from the lognormal distribution estimated by means of 
the average and standard deviation of inpatient costs reported in López-Casasnovas and 
Sáez (1999). 
 
Our estimate for the annual expected increase in costs from outpatient episodes is € 
1475263, with a standard error of € 325200. The corresponding figure for inpatient 
episodes is € 7447830 with a standard error of € 2392993. Thus the estimated increase 
in costs derived from a greater utilisation of public health care services resulting from 
the abolition of the partial rebate to private insurance costs, at € 8.9 M., is far smaller 
than the € 69.2 M. associated to the tax deductions for the expenditure on insurance 




Given that the difference between the expected increase in public health care costs and 
the forgone tax expenditures associate to the deductions is very large, it seems that our 
conclusion that subsidies to private health care costs are not self financing should be 
very robust. For the sake of completeness, however, we think it is useful to discuss two 
issues that provide further support to the main result. 
 
First, as we mentioned in section 2, our dependent variable for inpatient hospitalization 
might be subject to measurement error. As explained in section 2, we do not actually 
observe whether an inpatient episode is public or private, but we use an algorithm based 
                                                           
16 The re sampling procedure uses as initial sample the set of individuals which are observed using health 
care services.    21
on other questions of the survey to impute an inpatient episode as public or private. In 
order to assess the robustness of our conclusions to this assumption we place ourselves 
in the worst possible scenario and compute the corresponding figures. Using the 
estimates for price elasticity (-1.14) and the increase in net premium paid by the 
consumer (4.3%), the reform is estimated to reduce by 4.9% the number of individuals 
with duplicate coverage. This means that 60674 individuals will switch from duplicate 
coverage to single coverage due to the reform. According to Table 2, out of these 60674 
individuals, 4793 will have an inpatient episode. Assume the worst scenario for our 
qualitative conclusions: every one of these 4793 individuals had the inpatient episode at 
a private hospital before the reform but after the reform they use a public hospital. In 
these circumstances the public health care costs would increase by € 16.6 M. 
Consequently, even in this very pessimistic scenario, the extra cost is very far from 
reaching the forgone tax expenditures due to the reform. 
 
Second, we observe a large decrease in the post reform market price of private medical 
insurance in our aggregate data of Table 6. This large decrease partially offsets the 
abolishment of the tax reform. But it could be the case that the pure effect of the reform 
had driven the market price to an even lower level than what the data show. This would 
be the case if, as one might expect, less healthy individuals are less price elastic (as they 
probably have a valuable long term relationships with their doctors). As the reform 
increases the net price paid by consumers, this would mean that the post reform pool of 
privately insured individuals would have worse health status than the pool previous to 
the reform. Consequently, to the extent that our aggregate datum of 104.3 is being 
inflated because the post reform pool of individuals with duplicate coverage is less 
healthy than the pre reform pool, a representative individual would face a post reform 
premium smaller than 104.3. If this were the case, even less people would drop their 
private medical insurance policies after the reform. This effect would tend to increase 
the gap between foregone tax expenditures and increased cost in the public sector thus 
reinforcing our qualitative results that subsidies to private medical insurance are not 
self-financing in the Spanish NHS. 
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
   22
This paper has proposed an empirical strategy to analyse whether tax subsidies to 
private medical insurance are self- financing. We construct a simulation routine based 
on a micro econometric discrete choice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of 
premium changes on health care utilisation at the outpatient and the inpatient levels. In 
our illustration we have shown how to deal with the fact that the PMI industry tends to 
be concentrated and therefore legal changes in the fiscal treatment of PMI might not be 
fully shifted to the consumers. Our methodology mostly uses pre-reform data to 
estimate the impact of the reform. Post-reform data are only used to estimate the effect 
of the reform on the private insurance premium equilibrium level. This means that our 
methodology can be applied to different countries before reforms take place if one is 
ready to adopt a similar assumption on the impact of the reform on the equilibrium level 
of the premium. This highlights the potential of our methodology for public policy. 
 
As an application of our methodology, we simulate a feature of the 1999 Spanish 
income tax reform that abolished the tax deduction for expenditures on individually 
purchased private health insurance using a representative sample of the Catalan 
population. Prior to the reform, tax expenditures arising from deductions after the 
purchase of private insurance amounted € 69.2 M. per year. The elimination of the 
subsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra cost of about € 8.9 per 
year. Consequently, we conclude that the abolishment of the tax rebate generated a 
surplus to the public sector. The large difference between the estimated extra public 
health care costs and forgone tax expenditures gives robustness to our qualitative 
conclusion.  
 
Our paper has simulated the impact of subsidies to individual purchase of private health 
insurance through the income tax. But as the income tax subsidy was eliminated in 
1999, the Spanish fiscal system started to subsidize PMI through corporate taxation to 
those firms that offer PMI plans to their employees. Do our results shed some light 
about whether PMI subsidies through corporate taxation are self-financing? Lack of 
relevant data prevent us from calculating the trade off between utilisation of public 
outlets and tax expenditures in the new situation. However, the ample difference shown 
by our results would suggest the hypothesis that the subsidy is not self-  23
financing.
17Notice that this is an informed speculation rather than a direct result of our 
research. In fact, subsidies through corporate taxation could be self-financing if 
purchase of PMI through the company was much more elastic than individual purchase. 
However, we cannot investigate this issue with the data available. This is an interesting 
topic for further research. For the moment it seems that the justification for the subsidy 
must be sought in terms of other relevant policy goals. On the equity front, evidence for 
Spain by Van Doorslaer et al. (2002) and Jones et al. (2002) shows that PMI actually 
contributes to pro-rich inequity in the access to specialists. Together with the evidence 
shown in this paper, these findings would cast doubt on the adequacy of subsidising 
PMI. However, the implications of subsidies for waiting lists in the public system, as 
well as the welfare gains of those that buy PMI are still open issues in the research 
agenda.   
 
                                                           
17 In the situation before 1999, the deduction in the income tax was a 15% of the PMI premium. After 
1999, the deduction is a 35% (the standard corporate rate tax) of the PMI premium. Ceteris paribus, the 
government would be granting even larger deductions with the post 1999 system than before 1999. 
Therefore it is hard to believe that subsidies through corporate taxation would be self-financing. 
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Table 1. Distribution of expenditure on private insurance premia. 
First quartile  460.19
Median 920.27
Third quartile  1303.72
Mean 989.70
Standard deviation  707.26
Grossed up expenditure (Million Euro)  461.33
Grossed up deductions (Million Euro)  69.20
Number of people with duplicate 
coverage 
1237745
Number of people with single coverage  4689393
Note: 2002 Euros. 
 
Table 2. Health care utilisation profile according to insurance.  Percentage of people in each category 
  Single Coverage  Duplicate Coverage 
Outpatient services 
Without any visit  82.7(0.4)  83.8(0.8) 
Visit Public GP*  9.16(0.3)  3.4(0.3) 
Visit Public Specialist*  6.76(0.2)  2.3(0.3) 
Visit Private GP*  0.23(0.05)  2.37(0.3) 
Visit Private Specialist*  1.10(0.1)  7.9(0.6) 
Total 100  100 
Inpatient stays 
Without any inpatient stay  92.10(0.28)  91.43(0.61) 
Public hospital stay*  7.41(0.28)  2.44(0.31) 
Private hospital stay*  0.42(0.06)  6.09(0.54) 
Total 100  100 
(*) The difference between single and duplicate coverage is statistically different from zero at the 95% 
confidence.  
Standard error in parenthesis 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for outpatient visits estimating sample 
  Mean 
and (S.d.)
Definition 
Female  0.48 =1 if individual is female, 0 otherwise 
  (0.45)  
SAH excellent or very good   0.16
  (0.37)
=1 if self-assessed health is either excellent or very,0 
otherwise 
SAH poor or very poor   0.40
  (0.49)
=1 if self-assessed health is either poor or very  
poor, 0 otherwise 
Age 43.79 Individual’s  age 
  (24.41)  
Limiting condition  0.14
  (0.34)
=1 if individual has presented a limiting condition in the 12 
months previous to the interview, 0 otherwise 
Number of chronic diseases  2.10  
  (2.19)  
Accident in previous year  0.20
  (0.40)
=1 if individual has suffered an accident in the previous 
year,0 otherwise 
Primary school  0.53
  (0.50)
=1 if  head of the household has completed primary 
school, 0 otherwise 
Secondary school  0.14
  (0.35)
=1 if head of the household has completed secondary 
school, 0 otherwise 
Intermediate university  0.02
  (0.14)
=1 if head of the household  has completed intermediate 
university, 0 otherwise 
Superior university  0.02
  (0.15)
=1 if head of the household  has completed superior 
university, 0 otherwise 
Unemployed without benefits  0.03
(0.18)
=1 if head of the household is unemployed and does not 
receive benefits 
   
Self-employed  0.06 =1 if head of the household is self-employed 
  (0.24)  
Second income bracket   0.23
  (0.42)
=1if household income is between 6010 and 9016 Euros, 
0 otherwise 
Third income bracket  0.21
  (0.41)
=1if household income is between 9016 and 12021 Euros, 
0 otherwise 
Fourth income bracket  0.16
  (0.36)
=1 if household income is between 12021 and 15027 
Euros, 0 otherwise 
Fifth income bracket  0.09
  (0.28)
=1 if household income is between 15027 and 18032 
Euros, 0 otherwise 
Sixth income bracket  0.09
  (0.28)
=1 if household income is between 18032 and 30054 
Euros, 0 otherwise 
Seventh income bracket  0.03
  (0.18)
=1 if household income is larger than 30054 Euros, 0 
otherwise. 
Log Premium  12.24
  (0.26)
Predicted log insurance premium 
Standard deviations in brackets.  30
Table 4. Parameter estimates for the outpatient conditional logit (bootstrapped standard errors in brackets) 
Opt.2  Opt. 3  Opt. 4  Opt. 5  Opt.6 
Constant -0.534 -1.269* 14.05* 14.35* 15.66* 
(0.314) (0.339) (4.300) (4.433) (4.293) 
SAH excellent or very good  0.321*  
(0.131)  
SAH poor or very poor  -0.349*  
(0.138)  
Dummy female over 40  0.432* 
(0.165) 
Age 0.005 -0.018* 0.024* 0.003 0.007 
(0.121) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Age^2/1000 -0.23  
(0.12)  
Age below 15  1.513* 0.977* 1.806* 2.836* 2.259* 
(0.285) (0.259) (0.519) (0.605) (0.337) 
Limiting condition  0.256 -0.215 -0.024 0.811* -0.443 
(0.130) (0.185) (0.283) (0.327) (0.227) 
Number chronic diseases  -0.058 
(0.044) 
Accident in previous year  -0.399* 
(0.169) 
Primary education  0.064 0.672* 1.377* 0.720* 0.825* 
(0.121) (0.163) (0.313) (0.317) (0.177) 
Secondary education  0.206 0.882* 1.270* 1.634* 1.608* 
(0.198) (0.223) (0.457) (0.511) (0.255) 
Intermediate university  0.706 1.528* 2.348 2.574 1.984* 
(0.446) (0.487) (3.22) (3.845) (0.506) 
Superior university  0.289 1.192* 2.441 2.832 2.513* 
(0.572) (0.495) (2.643) (2.554) (0.450) 
Unemployed without benefits  -0.851* -0.671 
(0.388) (0.501) 
Self employed  0.319 0.778 1.282* 
(0.237) (0.390) (0.218) 
Fourth income bracket  0.222 0.326 -0.318 0.133 0.534* 
(0.140) (0.203) (0.301) (1.005) (0.249) 
Fifth income bracket  0.057 0.770* 0.385 0.576 1.067* 
(0.154) (0.190) (0.313) (1.015) (0.262) 
Sixth income bracket  0.257 0.599* 0.810* 1.106 1.277* 
  (0.170) (0.226) (0.350) (1.008) (0.281) 
Seventh income bracket  0.328 0.920* 1.510* 1.152 2.041* 
  (0.226) (0.268) (0.413) (1.061) (0.298) 
Eight income bracket  0.145 1.272* 1.923* 1.724 2.646* 
  (0.250) (0.262) (0.361) (0.985) (0.297) 
Dummy top income bracket  -0.106 1.319* 1.183 2.272* 3.044* 
(0.465) (0.439) (6.864) (1.057) (0.410) 
Log premium  -1.594* -1.594* -1.594* 
(0.350) (0.350) (0.350) 
Log likelihood  -4185.31
Sample size  3182
(*) Statistically significant from zero at the 95% confidence level 
   31
Table 5. Parameter estimates for the inpatient conditional logit (bootstrapped standard errors in brackets) 
Opt.2  Opt. 3  Opt. 4 
Constant -2.428* 14.58* 16.64*
(1.173) (6.420) (6.282)
SAH very poor  -0.872 -1.467 -0.787
(16.00) (11.85) (0.513)
Dummy female over 40  0.978* 0.508 0.568*
(0.400) (0.335) (0.288)





Dummy chronic diseases  0.817*
(0.300)
Accident in previous year  -0.420
(0.259)
Primary education  1.161* 0.667 0.710*
(0.473) (0.360) (0.315)
Secondary education  1.289* 0.623 1.394*
(0.647) (0.473) (0.405)
Intermediate university  0.764 0.583 1.722*
(35.71) (7.42) (0.617)
Superior university  2.891 0.748 2.406*
(1.77) (6.78) (0.582)
Self employed  0.814 1.173*
(0.456) (0.332)
Fourth income bracket  0.156 0.370 -0.276
(1.163) (0.474) (0.471)
Fifth income bracket  0.702 1.03* 0.748
(1.098) (0.471) (6.786)
Sixth income bracket  0.982 1.111* 1.119*
  (1.101) (0.473) (0.400)
Seventh income bracket  1.006 0.645 1.502*
  (1.173) (2.785) (0.454)
Eight income bracket  1.371 1.724* 1.940*
  (2.086) (0.554) (0.474)
Dummy top income bracket  0.982 2.000 2.065*
(1.101) (2.423) (0.501)
Log premium  -1.547* -1.547*
(0.520) (0.520)
Log likelihood  -832.11
Sample size  1173
(*) Statistically significant from zero at the 95% confidence level 
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Table 6 Evolution of the rate of Increase of Consumer Price and Private Medical Insurance Index 
Year  (1) CPI  (2) PMII  (2)/(1) 
1994 4.54%  7.20% 1.587 
1995 4.55%  9.94% 2.182 
1996 3.86%  10.04%  2.603 
1997 2.19%  7.96% 3.637 
1998 2.13%  7.20% 3.385 
1999 2.78%  1.55% 0.559 
2000 3.84%  2.73% 0.711 
2001 3.55%  5.93% 1.669 
 
 